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A B S T R A C T
Eﬀectiveness of Agri-Environmental Schemes (AESs) as tools to enhance the rural environment can be achieved
not only by increasing uptake rates, but also by avoiding participating farmers abandoning the scheme once they
are in. For this reason, it is important to also consider what aﬀects farmers’ decisions to remain in the scheme
rather than leave it at the end of the contractual obligation. However, up to now, there has been very little on
this issue in the literature. The paper oﬀers a contribution to this by revealing the role of determinants like the
farmer’s and farm structural characteristics, farmer’s learning process, neighbourhood eﬀect and the impact of
changes in the policy design on the farmer’s decision to remain in the scheme over a long time scale. This is
examined in a long-standing scheme in the case study area, the Veneto Region of Italy. The paper uses duration
analysis and is based on longitudinal panel-data of the entire population of 2000–2015 adopters. By using only
data available in oﬃcial regional records, it also provides regional policy-makers with an operational tool that is
useful to analyse the impact of their AES design changes. The results of the duration models show that a larger
farm size, a younger farmer age, the succession in the family farm, and the farmer’s positive attitude towards the
environment, trigger longer durations in AES. Similarly, the impact of the accumulation of the farmer’s ex-
perience in the scheme management, as well as the neighbourhood eﬀect increase the probability of remaining.
Lastly, the changes in policy tailoring and targeting also have a positive impact on maintaining the farmer in the
scheme. The paper concludes by noting that duration analysis can deliver useful results in order to guide policy-
makers in the eﬀort to steer higher levels of farmers’ persistence in the scheme and provides some re-
commendations for a more mature agro-environmental policy design.
1. Introduction
Over the last four decades, the importance of EU Agri-
Environmental Schemes (AESs) as voluntary tools aimed to enhance the
rural environment beyond legal requirements has greatly increased, in
terms of both expenditure and participation (Riley, 2016). After a few
voluntary initiatives by individual countries in the 1980s (Ducos et al.,
2009), AESs gained momentum with the introduction of the ﬁrst EU-
wide Regulation 2078/92; since then, AESs have regularly been pro-
posed to farmers in three consecutive EU Rural Development rounds.
Prompted by the need to improve policy outcomes, research in the ﬁeld
of AES adoption has grown in parallel (Wilson and Hart, 2001) and a
large body of literature now provides scientiﬁc evidence of the role of
farm structural factors, farmers’ characteristics, motivations and atti-
tudes, and institutional elements as determinants of participation (see
Mettepenningen et al., 2013; Reimer et al., 2014; Lastra-Bravo et al.,
2015 for updated reviews).
In recent times, stimulated by a growing availability of participation
data and emerging concern about AESs’ eﬀectiveness in the long-term,
there has been a debate on the temporal dynamics of participation
(Ingram et al., 2013). It has been argued that AESs sometimes need a
long period to produce the desired environmental beneﬁts, often be-
yond the ordinary contract duration (Swetnam et al., 2004). In addi-
tion, they may require relevant changes to farming practices, resulting
in more complex and lengthy decision-making patterns (Gamon and
Scoﬁeld, 1998; Jackson-Smith et al., 2010; Karali et al., 2014, Pedzisa
et al., 2015). Once accomplished, adoption should hence be accom-
panied by steady behavioural changes (Reimer et al., 2014), while early
withdrawals from the schemes may jeopardize or even nullify the AESs’
long-term success (Wilson and Hart, 2001; Burton and Paragahawewa,
2011; Riley, 2016).
These arguments point out that there is a need to better understand
the determinants of farmers’ choices over a longer time scale than that
of a single contract; they also indicate that looking at AES from a single
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perspective that considers only adoption determinants would not fully
capture the impact of the policy design, hindering any understanding of
the reasons why a farmer would decide to remain in the scheme, signing
a new contract, or leave it when the opting-out opportunity is available
at the end of the contract. Attentively considering the patterns of the
decision to remain in a medium-long-term perspective would feed a
policy design better oriented towards persistent sustainable environ-
mental change (Morris, 2004).
Yet, given the recent attention to AESs’ time dynamics, and a per-
sisting scarcity of longitudinal data at farm level (Moser and Barrett,
2006, Kallas et al., 2010), the research on farmers’ choices regarding
continuation or disadoption of AESs over long time periods is in an
early stage and still poorly represented in the literature (Riley, 2016).
This paper aims to contribute to the nascent AESs’ duration research
by considering the role played by the time dimension on the farmers’
decision process when he/she faces the option of remaining in the
scheme by subscribing a contract again. More speciﬁcally, it intends to
reveal the eﬀects – over the ‘remaining or leaving’ option – of de-
terminants such as some static farmer’s and farm structural character-
istics as well as time-varying aspects aﬀecting the innovation diﬀusion
patterns like the farmer’s learning process linked to the duration and
neighbourhood eﬀect. The paper also addresses the eﬀects of changes in
the policy design, which have up to now been scarcely explored even in
the adoption literature (Raggi et al., 2015).
We chose as case study the AES with the longest history in the agri-
environmental policy of the Veneto Region1, Italy: a scheme aimed at
supporting planting and/or maintaining hedgerows and buﬀer strips on
farmland; with some policy design changes, the scheme has been on-
going in Veneto without interruption since the early 1990s. Analysing
such AES gave us the opportunity not only to explore the eﬀect of time
on farmers’ decisions in a long time perspective, but also to contribute
to ﬁll a gap in the literature as, to our knowledge, adoption and dis-
adoption of schemes focused on planting and/or maintaining landscape
and habitat elements as hedgerows or buﬀer strips have been scarcely
explored so far.
Additionally, our work provides regional policy-makers with a re-
latively ready-to-implement tool, useful to analyse the impact of their
AES design changes on the decisions of farmers to remain or leave, and
to further improve the schemes accordingly. This is possible because
only data obtained from oﬃcial regional records on AES contracts have
been used. As this information on participating farms is already pos-
sessed by the public authorities, no ad hoc costly and time-consuming
sample-based data collection is required to perform the analysis.
The study is based on a longitudinal panel dataset of the entire re-
gional population of adopters, i.e. those who have been in the AES for at
least one contract period over a time span of sixteen years (2000–2015).
2. Related literature
Initial contributions to studying how AES adoption rates have evolved
over time come from the agricultural innovation diﬀusion literature,
which has cast light on the factors aﬀecting the entry decision by early,
medium and late adopters. Examples include studies of diﬀusion of or-
ganic agriculture (Padel, 2001; Läpple and Van Rensburg, 2011), as well
as best management (Brown et al., 2016) and soil conservation practices
(Varble et al., 2016). The joint eﬀect of time, space and social capital
variables has also been tackled by several studies, showing the eﬀect of
physical neighbourhood (Lewis et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2012), peer-to-
peer learning (Woolcock and Narayan, 2000) and networks (Berger, 2001;
Klerkx and Leeuwis, 2009; Moschitz et al., 2015; Taylor and Van Grieken,
2015) on adoption rates of diﬀerent agricultural practices.
A series of researches address the issue of why farmers adopt or
abandon a certain farming practice in diﬀerent periods in relation to
external changes. Marenya and Barrett (2007), for example, showed
how ﬁnancial factors, technological progress and perception of risk,
delay the speed at which Kenyan farmers adopt or abandon soil fertility
management practices, while Nyblom et al. (2003) highlighted the role
of information in decreasing uncertainty when adopting innovation in
Finland. Yet, the literature on the determinants of the remaining or
leaving option over time seems hitherto to have mostly concentrated on
a broad international focus, with researches addressing cover crops in
northern Honduras (Neill and Lee, 2001), agricultural system shifts in
western Nigeria (Kolawole et al., 2003), lower-input rice technology
adoption and disadoption in Madagascar (Moser and Barrett, 2003),
sustainable agricultural technologies in Brazil (De Souza Filho et al.,
1999), introduction of technological inputs in Ethiopia (Dadi et al.,
2004), no-tillage practices in Australia (D’Emden et al., 2006), or land
use changes connected to deforestation in tropical America (Vance and
Geoghegan, 2002), while it is still fragmented when it comes to Europe
and AESs. Here, published research appears mostly concerned with
organic production, speciﬁcally horticulture in the UK (Burton et al.,
2003), vineyards in Spain (Kallas et al., 2010) and drystock in Ireland
(Läpple, 2010). Rural Environment Protection Schemes (REPS) were
studied by Hynes and Garvey (2009) and by Murphy et al. (2014), who
explored how Irish farmers respond over time to improved scheme
design. To our knowledge, very little is available speciﬁcally on land-
scape and habitat features such as hedgerows or buﬀer strips.
From a methodological perspective, most of the cited studies on
adoption, continuation and disadoption dynamics (Marenya and
Barrett, 2007; Neill and Lee, 2001; Kolawole et al., 2003; Moser and
Barrett, 2003; Murphy et al., 2014) have relied on cross-sectional data
and static models. For this reason, they fail to provide information on
the temporal dynamics of the diﬀusion-abandon patterns among
farmers (Moser and Barrett, 2006). Authors are generally conscious that
the dynamics of innovation adoption ‘rather than being an event, is best
seen as a process, shaped by a multitude of changing factors and en-
dowments’ (Shields et al., 1993). However, the lack of adequate panel-
data and the complexity of reconstructing the dataset from oﬃcial ar-
chives at farm level (Marra et al., 2003) or through retrospective
sample-based surveys recreating the participation history (Moser and
Barrett, 2006), limit the diﬀusion of analyses speciﬁcally focused on the
temporal dynamics of farmer participation (Ingram et al., 2013).
Nonetheless, a few papers have recently highlighted the crucial
contribution that duration analysis, long used in biomedical, en-
gineering and social research, can oﬀer. Being based on longitudinal
panel-data, duration analysis is a powerful tool for exploring temporal
adoption dynamics: thanks to the simultaneous use of cross-sectional
and time-varying data, duration analysis allows continuation or dis-
adoption choices to be fully explored from a dynamic perspective, as
well as to consider the impact of external variables, for example
changes in policy design, and to link them to the moment in which the
decision to leave or remain is taken (Läpple, 2010). However, because
of the high complexity of data required, there have been few applica-
tions of duration analysis so far in agricultural economics, which in-
clude the already quoted works by De Souza Filho et al. (1999), Dadi
et al. (2004), D’Emden et al. (2006), Hynes and Garvey (2009), Moser
and Barrett (2006), Burton et al. (2003), Kallas et al. (2010), and Läpple
(2010).
3. Case study and policy context
More than half of Veneto, a region in the north-east of Italy, consists
of the Po Valley, a large, fertile, intensively farmed area. This vast ﬂat
territory has a long colonisation history with many changes to its
landscape over time. Until the ﬁrst third of the 20th century, the typical
Veneto Po Valley landscape was formed by farming plots completely
surrounded by rows of trees. In the last eighty years, with the expansion
1 The term ‘region’ is used here with a legal-administrative meaning, rather than a
broad geographical one. The regional government in Italy has legal-political jurisdiction
over the design of the Rural Development Programmes, hence over AESs.
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of urbanisation, industrialisation and farm mechanisation, the green
edges of farmed ﬁelds almost completely disappeared, making way for
wider ﬁelds with no or very few hedgerows (Tempesta, 2010). The
remnants of the old forests were cleared and replaced by urban sprawl
(Vaz and Nijkamp, 2015). During the 1980s, eutrophication of the
Venice lagoon due to high nutrient loads from the intensively-farmed
area of the watershed, emerged as an urgent problem (Collavini et al.,
2005), inducing the regional authorities to designate the Venice lagoon
drainage basin as a priority target area for regulating non-point pollu-
tion (Marcomini, 2005).
When the regional authorities began to implement the EU agri-en-
vironmental policies in this scenario, attention was paid to improving
landscape and ecological connectivity and mitigating the eﬀects of the
high nutrient loads in surface and ground waters in the intensively
farmed areas. To this end, planting and maintaining hedgerows and
(later) buﬀer strips was one of the earliest measures adopted. In order
to reach the highest eﬀectiveness, and considering that farmers looked
at hedgerows and buﬀer strips as a burden for mechanisation of their
farms and a receptacle of pests (INEA, 1999), a series of voluntary
schemes has been oﬀered to farmers since the early 1990s. Regional
initiatives – Regional Law no. 42/1997 (Regione Veneto, 1997) and
Piano Direttore 2000 for Venice drainage basin (Regione Veneto, 2000) –
followed the EU programmes and mimicked their design, providing
additional funds to increase farmers’ participation in speciﬁc target
areas.
Before the turn of the millennium, EEC Regulation 2078/92 and the
connected regional schemes granted ﬁve-year contracts and aid only for
pro-actively maintaining existing hedgerows. The whole regional
farming area was eligible for participation. The policy was designed
according to a geographical criterion that assigned the highest payment
tier to farms in ﬂat areas and environmentally-sensitive zones (parks
and Venice lagoon drainage basin), medium to farms in hilly areas, and
the lowest to farms in mountain areas (Table 1). A minimum of 5% and
maximum of 10% of the Utilized Agricultural Area (UAA) was allowed
per farm under the scheme, the latter to avoid excessive extensiﬁcation.
Initially, the scheme struggled to take oﬀ, but applications later grew
and doubled in number in 1997, ﬁnally registering an overall uptake of
857 ha on 1876 farms, mostly in the lowlands (INEA, 1999).
In the new millennium, the policy design changed radically after the
inclusion of AESs within the framework of the Rural Development
Programmes (RDPs). In terms of targeting, farms in mountain areas
were no longer eligible, while geographically-diﬀerentiated payment
tiers were replaced by a system of area-based scores, assigning the
highest priority scores to farms located in environmentally-sensitive
target areas (Fig. 1). Regarding adoption of multiple measures, while in
Regulation 2078/92 higher premiums were oﬀered to farmers com-
bining integrated pest management and organic agriculture with
hedgerows, in the 2000–2006 RDP these were no more oﬀered. Only
few extra ranking points (2/19) were given to farmers who combined
participation to more than one AES in the same farm. In the most recent
RDPs, i.e. 2007–2014 and the current one, this type of incentive was
cancelled. In any case, participation to multiple measures did not oc-
curred very often in the region: for example, in the period 2000–2006,
hedgerows were combined with integrated agriculture only in 6,4% of
cases and with organic agriculture only in 3,2%.
Tailoring eﬀorts were also made to align the policy design to the
situation on the ground, to increase the attractiveness of the scheme to
farmers:
– besides maintaining existing hedgerows, support was extended to
include the planting of new hedgerows or buﬀer strips
– a requirement for an additional grass strip to be kept free of culti-
vation, so to reduce the disturbance on the hedgerow or buﬀer strip
habitat, was introduced. This area was compensated with a payment
and facilitated also the mechanical crop management by the farmer.
The minimum required width of this grass strip was gradually in-
creased over time
– the upper threshold of farm UAA under contract was increased to
20% for buﬀer strips, while it remained at 10% for hedgerows
– the pre-existing minimum of 5% of UAA, discouraging participation,
was replaced by 0.25 ha until 2008, then reduced to 0.125 ha in
2009.
Payments were also simpliﬁed and reshaped (Table 1). The most
important changes introduced since 2007 have been:
– all costs incurred by farmers participating in the scheme were re-
funded, based on an average estimate of planting and management
costs, of gross-margin lost due to the UAA reduction and of trans-
action costs
– a progressive increase of payments was introduced in order to take
into account i) the impact on opportunity costs of participating
connected to the CAP ﬁrst-pillar area payments gradual decoupling
and the dynamics of crop prices and ii) the higher average costs
(with respect to the cost estimates used in the RDP 2000–2006)
incurred by smaller farms when compared to larger farms
– the payments schedule was better matched to farmers’ expenditure-
ﬂows over time by passing from a ﬂat average payment over ﬁve
years to a diﬀerentiated payment for planting (una tantum) followed
by ﬁve years for maintenance
– a simpliﬁcation of both payment structure and its management was
introduced, as the payments for the grass strip area − initially
managed independently − were uniﬁed with the connected
hedgerow or buﬀer strip area
– an incentive to remain in the AES was set up, through an annual
payment given to farmers who subscribe a renewal contract higher
than that given to new AES adopters.
Table 1
Payments granted for hedgerow and buﬀer strip planting and maintenance under diﬀerent AES policy designs in the Veneto Region 1994–2015.
Payments − € per m2 per year
(a) Maintaining existing
hedgerows
(b) Planting new hedgerows
or buﬀer strips
(c) Maintaining hedgerows or
buﬀer strips
(d) Maintaining hedgerows or buﬀer strips
from participation in previous AESs
(e) Grass strip
Before 2000 0.10−0.20b
2000–2006 1.50c 0.50 0.50 0.13
2007–2014 5.45 until 2010 0.80 until 2010 1.29 until 2010 included in (c) or (d)
7.57 from 2011 1.16 from 2011 1.71 from 2011
2015–2020a 8.37 2.42d 2.42d included in (c) or (d)
a At the time of our analysis only one (d)-type call has been published by regional authorities.
b According to geographical location.
c 5-years ﬂat average payment per year, including planting and maintenance costs.
d Valid only if the farmer does not fulﬁl Ecological Focus Areas (EFA) commitments through hedgerows and buﬀer strips, otherwise payments are substantially lower.
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In return for payments, farmers who subscribed a contract had to
actively maintain the functionality of the hedgerows or buﬀer strips by
committing to various maintenance operations including pruning,
keeping crown density, controlling undesirable species, replacing dead
trees with native species only, and maintaining the grass strip in order
to keep the ecological functionality of such complex ecosystems (Sitzia
et al., 2013).
The eﬀorts to stimulate participation, and especially to include
small farmers, resulted in a successful increase of both area under
contract and number of participants: cross-section data of uptake report
1,500 ha on 2026 farms in 2005 (Agriconsulting, 2008), 2,944 ha on
3051 farms in 2012 (Agriconsulting, 2012) and 3,168 ha on 3992 farms
in 2015. 98% of the area under contract is localised in the lowlands,
where pre-existing hedgerows had almost completely disappeared as a
consequence of diﬀusion of intensive and highly-specialised agri-
cultural systems (Agriconsulting, 2008).
4. Model and data
When the AES contract expires at the end of its duration, a farmer
has the option of remaining in the scheme by subscribing a renewal
contract, or to leave it. Our focus is on this decision, i.e. we want to
model the remaining behaviour of a farmer who already was in the AES,
while we are not interested in the adoption behaviour of new partici-
pants in the scheme. Normally, farmers face this choice every ﬁve years,
at the end of the regular contract duration; however, longer durations
are also observed, when the regional authorities give the opportunity to
farmers to extend contracts until the end of the RDP programming
period. The contract conditions may remain the same or become more
favourable as pointed out in the previous section. The ‘remaining’ be-
haviour can be modelled under a duration analysis approach.
Given this focus, our risk set – the ‘population at risk’ – is made by
all farmers who are under an AES contract in the analysed period
(2000–2015) at least for a given spell. This implies that, diﬀerently than
the consuetudinary duration analysis approach, where the focus is on
the event-occurrence – that, in our case, would be represented by not
renewing the contract – we modelled the opposite perspective, i.e. the
non-occurrence, that is the ‘remaining’ option.
In bio-medical, engineering and social science research, where it has
been widely used for decades, duration analysis is usually referred to as
survival analysis (Vance and Geoghegan, 2002). Thanks to pioneering
work by Lancaster (1979), the method was later introduced in the
economic literature and used ﬁrst to address unemployment duration.
The literature proposes a wide range of duration models, ranging from
continuous-time parametric (e.g. exponential, Weibull, lognormal, log-
logistic distributions) and semi-parametric (e.g. Cox regression) models
to discrete-time hazard models (Singer and Willett, 2003). The choice of
a continuous or a discrete-time approach largely depends on the con-
tinuous or discrete survival time of the process being analysed
(DeMaris, 2004; Allison, 2014).
We adopted a discrete-time duration model, dropping the con-
tinuous-time approaches for two main reasons: i) the time at which a
farmer is ﬁrst exposed to the risk, i.e. he/she signs an AES contract, is
intrinsically discrete, as calls for contract subscription are not issued
every year in a given RDP, but depend on policy-makers decisions2; ii)
even more importantly, the decision to leave shows relevant ‘ties’ to the
duration, as this option is most frequently taken after the ﬁve-year
regular contract duration (or multiples of it); longer duration ties are
Fig. 1. Target areas for RDP 2000–2006 and RDP 2007–2014 (the target areas do not change in RDP 2015–2020).
2 The Veneto Region issued two calls at the beginning of the period for RDP
2000–2006, yearly calls for RDP 2007–2014, and – up to the time of our analysis – one
call in 2015 for RDP 2015–2020.
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also observed. When there are several tied-duration times in the data, as
in our case, the continuous-time approach becomes unreliable (Cox and
Oakes, 1984; Yamaguchi, 1991).
We created a yearly farm-level panel dataset of the entire popula-
tion of AES participants over a time span of sixteen years by linking
together the cross-section oﬃcial datasets of every AES call during the
period. When tracking the Land Register unit code of the land units
under contract, two diﬀerent cases occurred: i) in most cases, the land
units did not undergo an ownership change: in this case, the records
referring to the same farm over time were joint by means of the farm’s
ﬁscal code; ii) conversely, in some other situations, there was a change
of ownership or tenure; in these cases, we considered the contract as
continuing by a new farmer and not as a new entry. In other words, we
followed the history of the land unit remaining or leaving in the AES
also in case of change of ownership of the land unit itself. Overall, 5311
farms (4.7% of farms in the eligible areas of the Veneto Region ac-
cording to the 2010 Census) were under AES contract in the study
period, at least for a limited spell; no repeated events were observed –
i.e. farmers leaving the AES at a given time in the study period and
signing a new contract later.
A crucial aspect to be considered in duration analysis is the censoring
problem (Allison, 2014). In our dataset, only right-censoring occurs when
a farmer never abandoned the contract during the analysis period; con-
sequently, censored data are observed only in 2015, when a farmer re-
newed the contract under the ﬁrst RDP 2015–2020 call. The issue of left-
truncation – i.e. the farmer’s entry in the risk set prior to the start of the
study period – was easily addressed as our dataset reported the farmer’s
time of ﬁrst signing under the pre-existing schemes (Reg. 2078/92 or re-
gional initiatives, 4% of farmers in the panel dataset): the number of years
under ante-2000 contracts have been incorporated into the individual
farmer’s AES duration at each time t (Singer and Willett, 2003).
Under the discrete approach, the farm-based panel dataset has to be
restructured into a farm-year dataset, i.e. a dataset where a separate
observational record is created for each year t in which the ith farmer is
at risk of remaining or leaving the AES (Singer and Willett, 2003).
However, the ﬁrst ﬁve-year contract period is mandatory for the
farmer, so it is uninformative for our research purpose, being linked to
the adoption decision, not to the remain or leave one: therefore, by
analogy with Moser and Barrett (2006), we dropped the ﬁrst ﬁve re-
cords associated to the ﬁrst contract signed by the ith farmer in the study
period from the farm-period dataset, while the remaining or leaving
information from the 6th year is retained. Accordingly, 2922 farms of
the initial farm-based panel dataset led to 10745 observations in the
farm-year dataset. 42,5% of farmers in the farm-based panel dataset,
11.6% in the farm-year dataset, left the AES during the study period;
the median period of staying under the AES contract is 6 years, while
the observed maximum is 23 years. Fig. 2 reports the Kaplan-Meier
estimated survival function.
Under a discrete-time approach, the discrete time hazard Pit deﬁnes
the conditional probability that the ith individual faces the target event
at the particular time t, given that no event occurred to him/her before
time t, i.e. he/she is in the risk set at that time:
Pit= P (Ti= t |Ti≥ t)
where Ti is a discrete time variable that denotes event occurrence for
the ith individual. All records in the farm-year dataset are conditionally
independent (Singer and Willett, 2003).
The model used most for truly discrete-time hazard is the logit
model (Allison, 2014), which explains the log-odds of the event oc-
currence at time t as:
−
= +
′P
P
α t x βln
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( )it
it
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where α(t) explains how the log-odds of the event depends on time,
while xi takes into account the eﬀects of both time-invariant and time-
variant predictors.
As we preferred to model event non-occurrence, i.e. the remaining
event, rather than the leaving event, in order to more easily analyse the
eﬀect of predictors on the remaining option, the observed dichotomous
variable Ti deﬁning the target event occurrence for the ith farmer at each
time t was set at 1 for remaining and 0 for leaving.
Given the scarcity of duration literature, the independent variables
we included in the model were selected according mostly to AES
adoption literature. The latter considers that, in line with the theory of
reasoned action and planned behaviour (Ajzen and Fishbein, 2005), the
behavioural intentions of farmers are directly related to a wide range of
background factors: individual factors, including farm and farmer’s
factors, social factors and informational factors (Mettepenningen et al.,
2013). Amongst individual factors, the farm size usually shows a po-
sitive impact on AES adoption, with larger farms being more frequent
adopters (Wilson and Hart, 2000) or remainers (Läpple, 2010; Hynes
and Garvey, 2009); the farmer’s age, conversely, generally negatively
aﬀects the probability of staying in the scheme (Hynes and Garvey,
2009; Kallas et al., 2010). Social factors like the neighbourhood eﬀect,
that is the imitation of neighbour farmer, have also been found playing
a positive role into the decision to remain (Moser and Barrett, 2006).
Amongst the informational factors, the accumulation of experience by
the farmer in the speciﬁc AES, that grows with time, has a positive
eﬀect on the probability to remain (Hynes and Garvey, 2009; Moser and
Barrett, 2006). Nyblom et al. (2003) and Kallas et al. (2010) have
shown that ﬁne-tuning of policy design, acting through targeting and
tailoring, also aﬀects positively the adoption choices; however, Raggi
et al. (2015) have pointed out that these factors are still understudied.
In our model, α(t) is a linear and quadratic function of N_Years, a time-
varying variable describing how many years (including ante-2000 pro-
grammes, i.e. Reg. 2078/92 or regional initiatives) the farmer stayed in
the risk group (i.e. remained in the AES) until time t. In order to facilitate
the interpretation of the time eﬀect, N_Years was rescaled by subtracting
the median of duration as centring constant (Singer and Willett, 2003). In
line with referential adoption and disadoption literature (e.g. Hynes and
Garvey, 2009; Moser and Barrett, 2006) the accumulation of experience by
the farmer in the speciﬁc AES is explained by the ‘time’ variable N_Years
and we hypothesize that the longer the duration of participation until time
t, the greater the learning by doing by the farmer: hence the expected sign
of this time-increasing eﬀect is positive.
Despite the limited information available for each farm in the
Fig. 2. Kaplan-Meier estimated survival function.
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oﬃcial regional records on AES uptake, we were able to include in the
model a number of predictors which are consistent with the above-
mentioned theoretical approach.
The following covariates capture the changes in AES policy design
over time:
– two dummy covariates, treated as time-invariant, deﬁning the AES
policy design under which the farmer signs the ﬁrst contract −
Design07_10 and Design11_14, where Design00_06 is the baseline.
Given the increased tailoring eﬀorts to align the policy design to the
situation on the ground and the reshaped and increased payments,
we expect that AES adoption under more recent schemes positively
inﬂuences the log-odds ratio
– a dichotomous variable Area that equals 1 if the farmer is located in
the target areas when he/she signed the contract (Fig. 1) and 0
otherwise. The expected sign of this covariate is positive, given the
priority scores assigned to target areas.
The background factors are:
– a time-varying variable for farm size (farm UAA in hectares) F_UAA
– a dummy variable AES_Increase that equals 1 when the farmer has
increased the area under AES contract during his/her spell, and 0
otherwise
– a dummy variable Thickets that equals 1 if the farmer has also
planted or maintained thickets in the spell, and 0 otherwise. In our
model, this variable acts as a proxy for the farmer’s positive attitude
towards environmental protection. Indeed, the role played by
farmers’ personal motivations and attitudes towards environmental
protection on the decision to remain in the AES cannot be explored
directly, being constrained by information availability in the oﬃcial
regional database we used. However, other objective and measur-
able factors may act as proxies for positive environmental attitudes.
Defrancesco et al. (2008), for example, used past environment-
friendly practices adoption
– a categorical variable Age_Class that identiﬁes the age class of the
farmer (less than 40; 41–65; and over 65 years) at the time of
signing the ﬁrst AES contract in the case of sole proprietorship,
while other business types are considered together3. The over 65 age
class is the baseline
– a categorical variable Ch_Owner that equals 1 in case of ownership or
tenure changes during the study period, 0 otherwise. Given the re-
gional farm structure, mostly based on family farms, these changes
imply that, in most cases, younger family members take over the
farm management4
– lastly, a time-varying lagged variable LAG_Farms% expressing the
percentage of farms under AES at time t-1 located in the same mu-
nicipality as the ith individual. Given the unavailability of farm geo-
localisation in our dataset, we assume this variable as a proxy for the
spatial neighbourhood eﬀect on the decision to remain at each time
t, in line with e.g. Moser and Barrett (2006). We expect that this
spillover eﬀect is positive in the speciﬁc context of our analysis,
where hedgerows had nearly completely disappeared and farmers
were reluctant to introduce and manage them according to the de-
manding scheme requirements.
Table 2 reports some descriptive statistics of the predictors included
in the models.
5. Results and discussion
Table 3 presents the coeﬃcient estimates and associated standard
errors of the discrete-time duration models of remaining in the AES.
Model 1 includes only the predictors expressing changes of the
policy design and the area-targeting focus in the study period, and the
eﬀect of time, i.e. the number of years each farmer remains in the AES:
all the estimated coeﬃcients diﬀer signiﬁcantly from zero.
Results conﬁrm that the policy design is an important determinant
of farmers’ choices, as already highlighted by Nyblom et al. (2003) and
Kallas et al. (2010) for organic farming adoption and by Raggi et al.
(2015) for some agri-environmental measures with speciﬁc reference to
the policy targeting. Our model estimates show that the growing eﬀort
of the regional administration to tailor the policy design to the situation
on the ground, the adjusting of payments, as well as the ﬁnancial in-
centive to remain in the scheme (Table 1), positively aﬀect the re-
maining odds-ratio. Ceteris paribus, when a farmer enters the AES under
the RDP Design07_10, his/her remaining odds-ratio is nearly seventeen-
Table 2
Descriptive statistics of the predictors included in the model (n= 2922 farms).
Variables Statistic Value
Number of years under contract (N_Years) Median 6
Farmers participating in the AES for the ﬁrst time by RDP rounds RDP 2000–2006 or ante 2000 (Design00_06) % 63.4
RDP 2007–2014 until 2010 (Design07_10=1) % 29.0
RDP 2007–2014 from 2011 (Design11_14=1) % 7.6
Farms under AES located in target areas in selected years (Area=1) 2000 % 50.9
2006 % 56.0
2014 % 90.0
Farm Utilised Agricultural Area (hectares) (F_UAA) Meana 19.68
(221.16)
Farmers increasing the AES area in their spell (AES_Increase) Yes= 1 % 13.8
Farmers who planted or maintained thickets (Thickets) Yes= 1 % 10.5
Farms by type of business and farmer’s age class (for sole proprietorship farms only) (Age_Class) Other types of business (=1) % 8.4
Sole proprietorship ≤40 years (=2) % 13.7
41–65 years (=3) % 51.2
>65 years (=4) % 26.7
Ownership or tenure changes in the study period (Ch_Owner) Yes= 1 % 9.1
Mean% of farms in each Municipality under AES contract (LAG_Farms%), selected years 2000 Meana 0.08 (0.26)
2006 Meana 0.51 (0.81)
2014 Meana 2.67 (3.33)
a Standard deviation in parentheses.
3 The farm ﬁscal code provides information on farmer's age only for the sole proprie-
torship type of business.
4 This interpretation may appear strained; however it is justiﬁed by looking at the farm
structure of the region, where according to 2010 Agricultural Census, 93,2% of farms are
sole proprietorship family farms. In our dataset, amongst the 9.1% of farms that have
changed ownership, 73% have passed from a sole proprietorship to another individual
owner; among them, 89.2% passed the farm to a younger owner: in this case, the mean
age decrease is 24.4 years, that is approximately a generation.
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fold higher than under the Design00_06 baseline. The eﬀect of the ad-
justment of AES payments in the 2011–2014 period (Design11_14) is
still positive but lower than the impact of the most comprehensive RDP
2007–2010 policy review, which took into account the CAP Fishler
reform decoupling the area payments. Similarly, the policy targeting,
assigning priorities to farms in target areas (Area), has resulted in a
positive impact on the remaining odds-ratio, all else being equal. There
is consistency between our results and the ﬁndings of Murphy et al.
(2014) for Irish REPS, where higher payment rates and institutional
changes leading to a decrease in farmers’ participation opportunity
costs over time, increased their participation in more recent REPS.
In the estimated model, the time dependency of the log-odds is
captured by a quadratic function. The signs of the linear and quadratic
terms of N_Years show that the impact on the remaining log-odds ratio
increases as the number of years under contract until time t increases
for the average farmer, but the diﬀerential in logit hazard per year
declines over time, the log-odds function being concave to the time axis.
In line with the results obtained by Hynes and Garvey (2009) for the
Irish REPS, by Läpple (2010) for organic farming and by Moser and
Barrett (2006) for rice production practices in Madagascar, our ﬁndings
conﬁrm the relevant role played by time dynamics in the farmers’ de-
cision-making process. In our case, and consistently with the literature,
the positive impact of time-dependence of the decision to remain in a
given year is explained by the farmer slowly building up experience in
actively managing hedgerows and buﬀer strips according to the scheme
requirements. Moreover, it should be emphasized that the eﬀect of the
farmer’s skills accumulation process can be captured solely by duration
models, and not by conventional cross-section analysis (Burton et al.,
2003; Moser and Barrett, 2006).
In the second speciﬁcation of the model we included also the time-
varying and time-invariant covariates expressing the inﬂuence on the
remaining log-odds ratio of the farm and farmer’s speciﬁc variables, as
well as the time-varying lagged variable we considered as a proxy for
the spatial neighbourhood eﬀect.
The positive farm size (F_UAA) impact on log-odds is due to the fact
that the larger the farm is at a given time t, the lower the impact of
planting hedgerows along ﬁeld edges on the overall farm income.
Läpple (2010) and Hynes and Garvey (2009) had similar results when
analysing other agri-environmental measures.
As expected, an increase in the area under AES (AES_Increase)
during the spell positively inﬂuences the choice not to leave the
scheme, being the result of a farmer’s good evaluation of the impact of
the measure after having experimented it on his/her farm.
In the case of sole proprietorship farms, a negative eﬀect of farmer
age (Age_Class) on the remaining odds-ratio is observed, e.g. the re-
maining odds-ratio of farmers younger than 41 years is about twice that
of farmers aged over 65. This is in line with the duration analysis lit-
erature, where age is negatively related to the probability of staying in
the scheme (Hynes and Garvey, 2009 for REPS; Kallas et al., 2010 for
conversion to organic farming). However, both Moser and Barrett
(2006) and Läpple (2010) found that the age eﬀect is generally not
signiﬁcant.
According to the interpretation we gave to the Ch_Owner variable,
ceteris paribus, when one younger family member takes over the farm
management, the remaining odds-ratio at time t increases. In our view,
this result is connected to an age-reduction eﬀect during the spell,
which positively impacts on the risk of remaining. This may be seen as a
result of already-shared farm development pathways within the family,
including the contractual obligations that are bound to the land. To the
best of our knowledge, this eﬀect has not yet been explored under a
duration analysis framework. In the AES uptake literature – based on
cross-sectional data – where this aspect is however mostly considered in
terms of farmer’s succession planning and not on actual taking over,
negative or no signiﬁcant eﬀects are reported (Lastra-Bravo et al.,
2015).
The personal motivations and attitudes towards environmental
protection, expressed by the proxy Thickets, positively aﬀect the deci-
sion to remain at time t, nearly doubling the odds-ratio, all else being
equal. A similar eﬀect, based on primary motivational and attitudinal
data, was also found by Burton et al. (2003) and by Läpple (2010) for
organic farming adoption.
Besides the above-mentioned ‘learning by doing’, ‘learning from
other farmers’ – the neighbourhood eﬀect – may also inﬂuence both the
participation decision and, once a farmer is in the AES, the conditional
probability of remaining at year t (Hynes and Garvey, 2009). In the
literature, this eﬀect is reported as explaining several factors aﬀecting
Table 3
Duration models estimates for AES decision to remain.
Model 1 Model 2
Variable β (S.E.) Odds-ratio β (S.E.) Odds-ratio
N_Years 1.923 (0.068)*** 6.839 1.833 (0.070)*** 6.251
N_Years_squared −0.132 (0.006)*** 0.877 - 0.126 (0.006)*** 0.882
Design07_10 2.829 (0.143)*** 16.930 3.208 (0.152)*** 24.739
Design11_14 2.500 (0.238)*** 12.178 2.925 (0.247)*** 18.643
Area 0.262 (0.080)*** 1.300 0.433 (0.092)*** 1.542
F_UAA 0.003 (0.001)** 1.003
AES_Increase 1.432 (0.125)*** 4.186
Thickets 0.683 (0.139)*** 1.979
Age_Class: >65 years
Age_Class: Other business type 0.399 (0.180)** 1.490
Age_Class ≤40 years 0.715 (0.135)*** 2.045
Age_Class 41–65 years 0.549 (0.104)*** 1.732
Ch_Owner 3.905 (0.456)*** 49.665
LAG_Farms% 0.033 (0.011)*** 1.033
Constant − 0.236 (0.064)*** 0.790 − 1.501 (0.126)*** 0.223
Log L −2183.0 −1877.4
Cox and Snell pseudo R2 0.266 0.307
Nagelkerke pseudo R2 0.521 0.600
% of correctly classiﬁed cases 90.3 93.7
Farm-year observations 10745 10745
Number of farms 2922 2922
* p< 0.1.
** p< 0.05.
*** p< 0.01.
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Fig. 3. Percentage of farms under AES in the same municipality, study area, selected years*.
*The 2015 call new-entries are also reported in Fig. 3, although not considered in our analysis.
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the spatial innovation diﬀusion patterns: learning from other farmers,
receiving communications, interactions, sharing experiences and imi-
tation amongst neighbours (Raggi et al., 2015; Burton et al., 2003;
Läpple and Kelley, 2014) help to lower the uncertainty of the impact of
AES implementation on the farm management (Lewis et al., 2011) and
the pressure to comply with social norms (Moser and Barrett, 2006;
Chen et al., 2012). In our model, the neighbourhood eﬀect at time t on
the remaining log odds-ratio, expressed by the percentage of AES par-
ticipants in the same municipality as the farm in the previous year
(LAG_Farms%), is statistically signiﬁcant and remarkable: a 1% increase
in LAG_Farms% increases the remaining odds-ratio by 3.3%. With our
longitudinal perspective, this positive spillover eﬀect is observed not
only for farmers in the target areas, where it was expected and already
shown by Raggi et al. (2015), but also outside them (Fig. 3). This
highlights that the neighbourhood eﬀect plays a signiﬁcant role in AES
persistence over time independently of the geographical targeting of the
policy design. More generally, our results are consistent with those of
Moser and Barrett (2006) for disadoption of some rice production
practices and Lewis et al. (2011) for organic dairy farming.
6. Conclusions
Our work primarily aimed at estimating the impact of determinants
on the conditional probability that a farmer remains one more year
under the contract, after the ﬁve-year mandatory period, given that he/
she was previously participating in the AES. In particular, we scruti-
nized the role played by farmer’s and farm speciﬁc characteristics,
farmer’s learning process over time, neighbourhood eﬀect and changes
in policy design made by the regional authorities. To this end, we have
fully taken into account the time dimension and the impact of time-
varying factors, under a discrete-time duration analysis approach. By
focusing our attention on the remaining rather than on the adoption
perspective, we have enriched a still limited body of literature and of-
fered an original contribution to a theme deserving more attention,
given the stage of maturity AES are now reaching after more than two
decades.
Our results have shown that a larger farm size amongst structural
factors, a younger farmer as well as farm succession, with a new gen-
eration taking the lead, are all factors that positively aﬀect the decision
to remain. Similarly, the farmer’s positive attitude towards the en-
vironment triggers longer durations in AES.
The eﬀect of time emerged clearly in both models we estimated. The
accumulation of experience, growing with the number of years under
the AES contract, positively aﬀects the remaining decision of the
average farmer5: this result, not enough stressed by the literature, has
been made available thanks to the duration approach. Speciﬁcally, for
our case study area we found that the impact of the build-up of the
farmer’s experience on the decision to remain, although with de-
creasing rates, has a long persistence over time. The neighbourhood
eﬀect is also crucial for increasing the probability of remaining in the
scheme one year more. This eﬀect occurs in a dynamic perspective,
regardless of policy targeting in speciﬁc areas. Lastly, the changes in
policy tailoring and targeting made over time have a positive impact on
the remaining in AES, contributing to reintroduce landscape and ha-
bitat features which had disappeared in the regional lowlands.
Our results are based on the entire population of AES participants
and rely only on secondary data already available from public autho-
rities. This is a strength of our work, as it allows to directly estimate the
impact of AES design changes on farmers’ decisions to remain or leave
in a time-dynamic perspective without time-consuming and costly
direct surveys. However, because of the fewer information available on
each participant, our work is aﬀected by a main limitation, i.e. the ef-
fect of individual (farmer’s and farm) motivations and social factors is
not so widely explored in comparison to analyses based on primary
data. Caution should be exercised when extending our results to other
regions sharing with Veneto a similar farming structure. In our case-
study context, the interplay amongst the considered AES and the others
could be neglected, because adoption of multiple measures was not
strongly addressed in the policy design. In other regional contexts, this
issue may be important and therefore should not be ignored. More
generally, our results need to be corroborated by further analyses on
other regions and other AESs impacting on the overall farming system.
Overall, considering the above-mentioned caveats, our results show
that duration analysis could provide guidance to policy-makers to en-
tice farmers to remain, in accordance with the conclusion of Hynes and
Garvey (2009) that ‘high degree of persistence may have some policy
uses’. In our case, the following policy recommendations could be of-
fered:
• the issue of taking enough time before considering the AES as fully
established needs careful consideration; eﬀorts in information and
extension service provision cannot be restricted to the period prior
to, or immediately following, the signing of the ﬁrst contract, but
need to be continued in the following years, also after contract re-
newal
• farmer-to-farmer information sharing networks, representing the
social capital asset of the farm (Burton et al., 2003), should be
identiﬁed and used to reinforce not only AES participation (Läpple
and Kelley, 2014) but also AES persistence, as there seem to be
neighbourhood eﬀects in keeping farms in the scheme once they are
in, as well as learning by doing eﬀects that work in the same di-
rection
• policy-makers should leverage young farmers to act as examples,
spread information and technical knowledge on the scheme to the
whole farming community, given that they are more inclined to
remain in the AES. Rather than taking advantage of young partici-
pants to increase AES diﬀusion, public authorities just stimulated,
through the priority scores system, young farmers to sign contracts
in the 2000–2006 RDP
• changes in the policy design over time, when attempting to better
suit the situation on the ground, to ﬁne-tune and simplify the pay-
ment tiers, facilitate the decision to remain
• the gradual widening of target priority areas could be worth con-
sidering as a possible win–win strategy, taking advantage of the
neighbourhood spillover eﬀect on the decision to remain and saving
ﬁnancial resources previously assigned to higher payments for
farmers remaining in the policy – i.e. maintaining hedgerows or
buﬀer strips deriving from previous programming periods – rather
than for new entries (as in the RDP 2007–2014)
• as there is a positive eﬀect of farm size on the decision to remain,
care should be paid as to how the payments are estimated, especially
with regard to the higher impacts of participation costs on small
farms. This issue was already considered by the regional policy-
makers during the study period. However, it now needs further at-
tention, given that large farms can today include hedgerows and
buﬀer strips in the mandatory Ecological Focus Areas (EFA) re-
quired under the greening of the CAP ﬁrst pillar, while small farms
are exempt from EFA.
Thanks to our dynamic approach, which fully incorporates the time
dimension into the analysis of the farmers’ decision process to remain in
the AES for a long period, such policy recommendations may provide
policy-makers with more eﬀective information than static approaches,
enabling them to design more mature agri-environmental policies based
on persistent voluntary participation, and therefore to achieve a more
sustainable environmental change.
5 The eﬀect of time is explained as a self-learning eﬀect by the scarce duration lit-
erature. However, we agree with a reviewer that this interpretation has to be empirically
supported through farmers’ surveys: we plan to better explore this issue through a
questionnaire-based sample-survey.
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